Levinson Is to Mr. Justice  Isaiah  as St. Paul Was to the Prophet Isaiah by Weisberg, Richard H.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 5 Compromise and Constitutionalism Article 7
4-20-2011
Levinson Is to Mr. Justice "Isaiah" as St. Paul Was to
the Prophet Isaiah
Richard H. Weisberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Ethics
and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. Weisberg Levinson Is to Mr. Justice "Isaiah" as St. Paul Was to the Prophet Isaiah, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 5 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol38/iss5/7
Levinson Is to Mr. Justice "Isaiah" as
St. Paul Was to the Prophet Isaiah
Richard H. Weisberg*
I. FORWARD
II. COMPROMISING WITH PROFESSOR LEVINSON
A. Avishai Margalit
B. Law and Literature
C. The Deal Behind this Responsive Essay
D. Doing Justice to Sacred Texts
III. TOWARDS A LESS "FLEXIBLE" HERMENEUTIC
A. The Pragmatic Degradation ofBiblical Norms
B. The Example of Vichy Law
C. The Levinsonian Norm, Exemplified at the Vatican in 1941
D. Is the Battle for Textual Integrity Over?
IV. BACKWARDS
I. FORWARD
In his characteristically appealing way, Professor Sanford Levinson
takes time to defend compromise. But what he finally shows is that the
practice needs no such excellent advocates. We all live in a world of
compromise: the Founders, the Court, even Louis Dembitz Brandeis. So
what else is new?
II. COMPROMISING WITH PROFESSOR LEVINSON
In the interests of full disclosure, I need to inform my readers here that
my entire quarter-century relationship of friendship with Levinson himself is
based on compromise. I would cite three negotiations that are directly
relevant to his present paper.
* Richard H. Weisberg is Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law at the Cardozo Law
School, Yeshiva University. In addition to a book-length project intimately related to the broader
themes of this Article, his recent related activities involve a collaboration with Peter Brooks called
The Risks of Interpretive Flexibility in Times of "Emergency", and a forthcoming article, Law and
Literature as Survivor, in a PMLA volume edited by Anderson, Frank, and Sarat.
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A. Avishai Margalit
To lay down his predicate about different kinds of compromises,
Levinson cites the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit, who has recently
distinguished between "rotten" compromises and others that are more
benign.' When Levinson and I first met twenty-six years ago (counting
from the day I pen these words), it was to forge one of Margalit's
"acceptable compromises," one relating, as it turned out, to Margalit's own
apartment in Jerusalem. Levinson and I both had teaching appointments at
the Hebrew University. Margalit had this beautiful new place to rent. We
worked out a deal for the apartment (and car) that accommodated each of us
and our families, his for the fall semester, mine for the spring. During the
transition, a period of five days or so, I recall needing to lodge my family at
a hotel in East Jerusalem, while Levinson's had to leave Margalit's place a
bit earlier than they would have wanted. It was five days of relative chaos,
but for a good cause. It was kind of our own version of the Three-Fifths
Clause.
B. Law and Literature
Professor Levinson and I have toiled in the ranks of those helping to
establish the still relatively new interdisciplinary field called "Law and
Literature."2 Levinson's work in that area has always been supportive, but
skeptical. Levinson does not really wish, despite his attraction to the field,
to be known as a legal humanist. He willfully hides his humanistic heart
behind the stonier traditional legal academic front of political pragmatism as
embodied, of course, in his present paper.' My part of the bargain is that I
long ago forgave him this self-deception and have always delighted in
arguing with him (as I do here) over the specific emanations that emerge
from behind his articulate mask of hard-nosed realism.'
C. The Deal Behind this Responsive Essay
The words you are now reading resulted from a brief conversation
1. AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 1, 128 (2010).
2. "Law and Literature" is an interdisciplinary movement that focuses on topics such as
"restrictions on creative expression, hermeneutics (interpretive methodologies), and legal themes in
works of literature, and exploring law as literature." Law and Literature, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO
SCH. OF LAW (Nov. 18, 2007), http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspxccmd=
ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10440&contentid=982.
3. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, Law as Literature, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE
155 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
4. Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821 (2011).
5. For our interchange on torture, see TORTURE: A COLLECTION 23-43 (Sanford. Levinson ed.,
2004).
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Levinson and I had at Princeton this past summer,6 where he gave a version
of the Pepperdine "Compromise" essay.' He asked me to write a response
to the lecture, and then I asked him to write (separately) about my related
work about French lawyers during World War II, which tells a cautionary
tale for all those who would compromise basic professional principles in the
name of expediency.' It took several months, but we eventually reached an
agreement. I did not get exactly what I wanted, but when he reads this essay
he may find that neither did he.
D. Doing Justice to Sacred Texts
Reflecting on twenty-six years of friendly disagreements with Sanford
Levinson, I have come to see-and will so focus my remarks here-that the
principal issue separating us has to do with how we read our central guiding
texts. When a stressful new event challenges us to preserve or discard our
long-held and generally positive sense of a text's meaning, do we
compromise or instead make every attempt to preserve its better values
against the attack of easy expediency? These moments test our mettle, and
the easier path is to discard the idea of doing justice to the text. Even where
the text is generally valued positively over long periods of time by many
otherwise opposing interpretive communities, those like Levinson who are
"justice-skeptical" (and, in the Holmesian tradition, this includes most law
professors) gradually-if not quickly 9-permit a falling off of traditional
understanding where expediency (its own "norm") demands compromise.
III. TowARDS A LESS "FLEXIBLE" HERMENEUTIC
A. The Pragmatic Degradation ofBiblical Norms
Levinson places his essay appropriately under the sign of Pepperdine's
6. The conference on "the Limits of Flexibility" was organized by Professors Peter Brooks and
Richard Weisberg, and was held at Princeton University on August 10-11, 2010. Karen Donovan,
Princeton Conference Asks: Do We Need a Slow Law' Movement?, CARDOZO LAW (Aug. 31,
2010), http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd=ContentEdit&ucmd=User
Display&userid=10572&contentid=17176&folderid=540 (discussing the conference).
7. See Levinson, supra note 4.
8. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST tN FRANCE (1996). The
relevance of my study to Levinson's thinking will become abundantly clear in these pages.
9. Professor Levinson's original response to Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), made in early
2001, was that it should push people "to the barricades." Levinson, however, writes more benignly
about the decision in his current paper.
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fine ethical mission statement.' 0 He is setting us up for the kind of reversal
he is famous for. Of course he acknowledges that such ethical norms of
behavior seem all well and good until we test them against the (supposed)
realpolitik of men exercising power. (Perhaps coincidentally, there are no
women in his essay.) The Bible and other sacred texts have their place, he
seems to be saying, but not when the exigencies of power downgrade
commandments to "suggestions" or transmogrify the Equal Protection
Clause into a way to get the Republican candidate elected.
Of course, the tiresome process of making textual compromise our
guiding norm was begun by men in different places and eras. Levinson is
heir to the very religious tradition he invokes at the beginning of his essay:
the sacrifice of ensconced positive textual meanings began big time around
2000 years ago when the Jewish Bible itself was artfully reconstructed to
provide (against all the textual odds) for a prediction of Jesus-as-Messiah."
To make the unbelievable fully acceptable, these men then ensconced as a
principle the very textual sloppiness they employed in the first place. So the
"Bible" was split into two parts: the "Old" was thought to embody precisely
the textual strictness that the "New" thinkers, like Levinson today, wished to
jettison. They preferred a less harsh world that would be followed by a
lovely afterlife, vouchsafed to those who performed one act of faith instead
of having to follow the 613 daily strictures imposed under the "Old" regime.
Levinson's essay carefully notes this difference (perhaps I have influenced
him here in ways I will reiterate shortly) when he observes early that Justice
Brandeis was a Jew who was thought by many to embody the ethical
toughness of the "Old" tradition even as he acted successfully in the "New"
world. But even Isaiah,12 the nickname for Justice Brandeis that evoked the
man's prophetic demand for justice, was, in Levinson's view (over-stated, I
10. Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 821,824 (2011).
11. As Nietzsche tells the story:
However strongly Jewish savants protested, it was everywhere sedulously asserted that
the Old Testament alluded everywhere to Christ and nothing but Christ, more especially
His cross, and thus, wherever reference was made to wood, a rod, a ladder, a twig, a tree,
a willow, or a staff, such a reference could not be but a prophecy relating to the wood of
the cross: even the setting up of the Unicorn and the Brazen Serpent, even Moses
stretching for this hands in prayer-yea, the very spits on which the Easter lambs were
roasted: all these were allusions to the Cross, and, as it were, preludes to it! Did anyone
who kept asserting these things ever believe in them? . . . They were engaged in a
struggle, and thought more of their foes rather than of honesty.
FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THE DAWN OF DAY 84 (Oscar Levy, ed., J.M. Kennedy trans.,
1924); accord RICHARD WEISBERG, Nietzsche's Hermeneutics: Good and Bad Interpreters of Texts,
in NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY: HALF-WRITTEN LAWS 149, 153 (Peter Goodrich & Mariana
Valverde eds., 2005) (explaining my reading of this aphorism).
12. 1 have written about the degradation of understanding by the New Testament exegetes of the
actual book of Isaiah in an essay relevant to these remarks. See WEISBERG, supra note I1, at 158. 1
am most of the way through a book that sources textual compromise to St John's misreadings of the
Jewish Bible, especially the book after which Justice Brandeis got his nickname.
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believe)," one of the Court's typical compromisers.
Of course, the Levinsonian syllogism easily adduced from Isaiah's long
judicial career, is supposed to go like this: (1) find the most righteous among
us; (2) identify a few of their compromises; and (3) conclude that
compromise is the universal, indeed the only, "norm." I would remind
Levinson that a good deal of work, including my own, tends to show that
that easy logic itself flows from the major compromise in western thought:
the compromising of "Old Testament" meanings by the original Christian
exegetes. 14
Those favoring compromise even of our most sacred positions-and
they are most of us-have won the battle but not the war, which continues to
be waged against them by a few people in each generation who, like
Nietzsche, demand respect for sound textual readings and equate
hermeneutic compromise with moral failure. For a while now, I (joined
recently by Peter Brooks and Elaine Scarry, among others)" have been
thinking about the limits of hermeneutic flexibility. My claim has been
relatively simple: there is a way of evaluating a textual reading along a
spectrum that includes unacceptability. In other words, we believe, certain
compromises with texts are "rotten." For a long time, both the simplicity of
the claim and the fact that it is unfashionable had somewhat marginalized it.
However, modes change, and today's critical, theoretical, and historical
environments have opened considerably to positions akin to those reiterated
and further developed in this paper. 16
As Professor Levinson well knows, Nietzsche's aphorisms stand second
only to the Jewish Bible (and maybe Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor)7 in my
personal honor guard, and I have lost many deconstructionist friends by
criticizing the grotesque misreadings of Nietzsche by Jacques Derrida, their
hero.'1 For it was Nietzsche who attacked consistently the deconstructive
13. When Levinson brings Brandeis down to earth, he is merely recreating the interpretive wheel
the Gospel writers used to bring the old prophet Isaiah along to their improbable position.
Levinson's section Brandeis as compromiser proves only that, as a novice Justice (in the "Starbird"
case) and then as a more veteran member of a collegial institution, Brandies would occasionally
suppress dissents in cases "considered to be of no great consequence." Levinson, supra note 4, at
839-40.
14. See, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, JESUS AND YAHWEH (2005).
15. See Donovan, supra note 6.
16. For a key moment in this turn, see Lawrence Buell, Introduction: In Pursuit of Ethics, 114
PMLA 7 (1999). Lawrence Buell was the chair of the English department at Harvard University at
the time he published this article. Id.
17. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (Harrison Hayford & Merton M. Sealts, Jr. eds.,
1962).
18. Oddly, perhaps, my critique of early Christian exegesis has never lost me a single friend
among Catholics or Protestants. See Richard H. Weisberg, 20 Years (or 2000?) of Story-Telling on
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readings of the Jewish Bible by the Gospel writers, and who in every other
way, too, indicated his belief in a hermeneutic project that-contrary to
those Christian interpretive strategies-could indeed postulate the true sense
of a text.19
The debate about textual compromise will not be resolved soon, even in
the pages of this fine law review. To his credit, and thankfully perhaps,
Levinson largely deals here with the more mundane texts and traditions of
the United States Supreme Court. How much distortion, Levinson asks in
this variation on his theme, is permissible when the Court deals with such
issues as standing (Newdow),20 or equal protection (Bush v. Gore),2' or
liberty and the pursuit of happiness (except for slaves, as seen in Dred
Scott).22 Levinson doesn't have to dig down too much to find folks like
Alexander Bickel or Chief Justice Rehnquist 23 and most other voices from
Burke to today support his conclusion: "I hope that I have adequately
demonstrated that 'compromise' is ubiquitous to constitutionalism." 24
I have already noted my agreement with my friend that destabilizing
great texts, particularly great codes, has been fashionable for a long time. I
concede the point and in deference to Professor Levinson's magisterial grasp
of constitutional history and law, I would frankly never dare to challenge
such a conclusion on the turf of the cases he discusses so well. But the
pervasiveness of compromise cannot in and of itself demonstrate
compromise's soundness. To be "ubiquitous" is not to be right. The nearly
universal nature of compromise, thankfully, provides many historical
examples of its deleteriousness, particularly when it is raised-as Levinson
does here-to a norm. The antinomianism of the early Christians made life
easier for their eventually huge flock but not necessarily better. Over two
millennia, the great risks of overly flexible textual methods have emerged.25
the Law: Is Justice Detectable?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223, 2230-36 (2005) (providing my detailed
analysis of Derrida's Force of Law and Spurs); RICHARD WEISBERG, On the Use and Abuse of
Nietzsche for Modern Constitutional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3,
at 181.
19. My colleague Stanley Fish and I have also "had it out" on similar issues. See Richard H.
Weisberg, Fish Takes the Bait: Holocaust Denial and Postmodernist Theory, 43 CRITICAL Q. 19
(2001) (elaborating on an exchange between Fish and myself at Emory University).
20. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
21. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
23. For my own recent take on Chief Justice Rehnquist's particularly insidious form of textual
distortion, see Richard H. Weisberg, The First Amendment Degraded: Milkovich v. Lorain and a
Continuing Sense ofLoss on Its 20th Birthday, 62 S.C. L. REv. 157 (2010), which is a kind of sequel
to Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with
an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 42-58 (1982).
24. See Levinson, supra note 4, at 842.
25. See WEISBERG, supra note 8 and the many responses to it that are summarized and further
answered in RICHARD H. WEISBERG, Difering Ways of Reading, Differing Views of the Law: The
Catholic Church and Its Treatment of the Jewish Question During Vichy, in 2 REMEMBERING FOR
THE FUTURE: THE HOLOCAUST IN AN AGE OF GENOCIDE 509-30 (John K. Roth et al. eds., 2001).
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My task today is to deconstruct the word "compromise" in order to show the
risks involved in furthering what I have called an "overly flexible
hermeneutic." The essential claim of my paper today is that there are limits
on interpretive creativity, limits demarcated by violations of understanding
brought to certain texts by long-standing hermeneutic traditions.
B. The Example of Vichy Law
In Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France,26 I argued that a form of
flexible deformation of ensconced textual understandings gradually
permitted French lawyers, influenced by their religious leaders in many
cases (the most infamous of which I shall shortly recount), to overcome their
native aversion to indigenous anti-egalitarian laws against the Jews. To
reach an infamous eventual product of nearly 200 laws against Jews
promulgated for the most part without significant German pressure and often
surpassing through French "logic" even the Nazi racial precedents, French
lawyers during World War II first needed to leap a hurdle not present in
most other countries victimized by Hitler-they had to reckon with their
ingrained belief in egalitarianism, a staple of the French legal system since
1789 and one that endured throughout the first decades of the 20th century.
These were turbulent years that included the Dreyfus trial (which did not, of
course, involve any statist racial legislation). The compromise with received
codified meaning occurred over a four-year period, during which-with the
help of Catholic hermeneutic flexibility strikingly evocative of Levinson's
mainstream approach to compromise-the French little by little degraded
their traditional understandings of the word "equality." Under color of
Vichy law, some 75,000 Jews were sent "to the East" and 3000 more
perished in French-run camps.
As in the earliest period of textual deformation from whose lessons (as I
shall show) secular people gained sustenance in their remarkable overturning
of the excellent older (Biblical) code, ordinary French lawyers forced to deal
with their training as egalitarians were partly motivated by a feeling of
"emergency" or "necessity."28 For Vichy lawyers, judges, and
26. WEISBERG, supra note 8.
27. See generally WEISBERG, supra note 8 (discussing the killing of Jews in French death camps
"in the East").
28. This tendency to "compromise" during emergencies began with St. Paul. The belief was that
the world was ending and something radically "new" was required. This helps to explain his need to
deform the Jewish Bible to address the "crisis." See, e.g., BLOOM, supra note 14; DAVID
KLINGHOFFER, WHY THE JEWS REJECTED JESUS: THE TURNING POINT IN WESTERN HISTORY
(2005); FRANKLIN H. LITTELL, THE CRUCIFIXION OF THE JEWS (1975); TRUDE WEISS-ROSMARIN,
JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY: THE DIFFERENCES (1943); A.N. WILSON, PAUL: THE MIND OF THE
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academicians, the crisis after the French defeat by Hitler also seemed
crushing and almost eschatological in its dimensions. All periods of
interpretive departure are marked by some semblance of "emergency"
conditions-real or imagined. Thus Vichy stands as a cautionary example
for post-9/11 Americans dealing with a range of "new" issues like how far to
go with interrogation techniques, wiretapping, executive power, etcetera.
More to the basic argument of this paper, overhasty departures from
established norms previously received as "good" have occurred with usually
baleful results since Paul, John, and other writers in the first century moved
to abolish constraints on textual understanding. Their move has affected
people's actual behavior, as in Vichy.
Archival documents and interviews revealed that French lawyers (even
some who were in the government) were averse to indigenous laws that so
compromised their own traditional understandings of the law, not to mention
the encoded constitutional-level texts they had been trained to revere. No
crisis (again, the word was used loosely even as post-War France revealed
the normalcy of life in Vichy and even in the Occupied Zone) could easily
jar them from their trained professional instincts; the laws their own
autonomous government had passed were bizarre. The point was made early
by a young law professor, who wrote in a prominent law journal, and
although he knew his audience would include Nazis and Vichy officials,
thought all his colleagues would accept his argument. His name was
Jacques Maury, a professor at the Toulouse Law School. Virtually
immediately after Vichy promulgated its first anti-Semitic laws (October 3-
4, 1940), Professor Maury published his uncompromising sense of the
existing interpretive traditions and how Vichy's new, anti-Semitic laws
violated it. Maury noted that the 1940 legislation went much further than
any restrictive legislation passed before and that "[t]he French people find
themselves placed in three categories of non-identical status. There is an
increasing abandonment of our long-held rule guaranteeing equality in their
rights as well as in their responsibilities to all French people."29
Professor Maury was neither punished nor (sadly) endorsed by any
government or collegial group. His insistence on the preservation of the Old
"code" was not heeded by the legal community. His peers enjoyed, even
amidst the worst tyrants of the century, the same chance he had to protest
directly against the bizarre, offensive new laws. They chose instead to adapt
to it, rejecting their training and traditions. Compromise of this sort,
encouraged by specters of "emergency," often prevails. So it did in Vichy
France.
APOSTLE (1998).
29. Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 285,
293-94 (1993) (quoting Jacques Maury, J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, doc. 169 (Oct.
18, 1940)).
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C. The Levinsonian Norm, Exemplified at the Vatican in 1941
To produce within an entire community of lawyers a willingness to
deform tradition and to compromise with such a key, ingrained feature of
foundational French law, there had to be in place a hermeneutic principle of
flexibility. (Levinson wishes to re-instantiate exactly this principle in his
remarks today.) All historians now agree that the fear of the Germans in
France was not a factor in the gradual ripening of home-grown laws that
violated egalitarian norms still dear to the legal community in France
throughout World War II. What occurred was a classic but fascinating
variation on "compromise," one that puts the Levinsonian approach to the
subject under the microscope. The French found a source for the eventual
surrender of the egalitarian norms that explains better even than traditional
anti-Semitism the tragic promulgation of the 200 Vichy laws and regulations
against the Jews. The "Talmudic" Jew, the very model of righteous
adherence to "the Book," was to be expunged from the French community,
stripped of wealth, placed in hideous French-run camps where 3,000 died,
and eventually-under color of Vichy law-sent "to the East." The
"compromise" principle, which had its hermeneutic origins in the early
Christian interpretations of the Jewish Bible, was always there in French-
Catholic thinking, and it presented explicitly on a singular occasion during
Vichy itself.
Marshal Philippe Petain, Vichy's octogenarian leader, had jumped the
gun on any Nazi pressure whatsoever by promulgating anti-Semitic laws as
one of his government's first orders of business. As the first law snowballed
into what would become a flood of statutory and judicial activity relating to
the Jews, Petain may have had misgivings. Perhaps his aging body called
attention to the eventual fate of his immortal soul, but whatever the reason,
this not particularly religious French Catholic commissioned an inquiry by
his emissary to the Vatican to find out if the Church had any objections to
Vichy's racist policies. 30 A lawyer, Leon Berard, took most of the summer
of 1941 to answer his leader's question. As war raged and Jews were being
killed in the East and targeted for round-ups in his own home country,
lawyer Berard interviewed dozens of Vatican officials at the highest levels.
He finally provided a description of the Church's answers to Petain's basic
question: "Does the Catholic hierarchy object to my regime's laws defining
and excluding people just because they are Jews?" Berard begins by
explaining that-yes!-the Church is firmly opposed to racism of all kinds,
that Vichy's focus on grand-parental heritage managed to define as Jews
30. See WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 421.
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many baptized Roman Catholics, that morally the Church firmly opposed
these kinds of laws, etcetera.3 '
But then the long letter came to what I call its "compromising kicker."
Harking to its 1500 year old tradition of textual distortion, the Church during
World War II managed to espouse a strict moral edict while also
compromising utterly. As Berard describes the Church's "bottom line" to
his leader:
[A]n essential distinction that the Church has never ceased to admit
and to practice, for it is full of wisdom and reason: the distinction
between thesis and hypothesis, the thesis in which the principle is
invariably affirmed and maintained, and the hypothesis, where
practical considerations are organized . . .. Conclusion[:] the law of
2 June 194132 contradicts a principle held by the Roman Church.
But it does not at all follow from this doctrinal divergence that the
French State is threatened with . . . even a censure or disapproval
that the Holy See might express in one form or another regarding
the Jewish laws ... . As an authorized person at the Vatican told
me, they mean no quarrel with the Jewish laws.
The limits of compromise-not only practiced but actually theorized-
have been reached. A great moral authority files for moral bankruptcy and
finds a norm-a "hypothesis"-to justify its misreading. Roman
Catholicism, like the Gospels that set infinite flexibility of understandings
into high gear, is intransigent about its own flexibility. The moral
opportunity, the chance to be hard-nosed and stubborn and to insist on
righteousness, was lost forever.34
D. Is the Battle for Textual Integrity Over?
Harold Bloom prefaces a powerful chapter of his recent Jesus and
Yahweh-a chapter whose consistent theme of the unacceptability of many
Pauline Biblical readings duplicates the argument I make here-with this
provocative sentence: "It is now altogether too late in Western history for
pious or humane self-deceptions on the matter of the Christian appropriation
of the Hebrew Bible."35
31. See id at 421-24 (quoting Berard's letter at length).
32. This was Vichy's most comprehensive racial law, which defined "Jew" as an individual with
three or more Jewish grandparents or with only two if married to a Jew or unable to sustain the
burden of proving non-Jewishness. See WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 58-81 (discussing the law of 2
June 1941).
33. Id. at 423-24 (quoting Berard's letter to Petain).
34. See JOHN CORNWELL, HITLER'S POPE (1999); DAVID KERTZER, THE POPES AGAINST THE
JEWS (2001); MICHAEL PHAYER, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE HOLOCAUST (2000).
35. BLOOM, supra note 14, at 72.
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I read Bloom to be making his own pragmatic "compromise" with 2000
years of interpretive distortion. Whether "rotten" or benign, this is a
compromise that I cannot accept. The battle still rages as to whether, again,
there are identifiable limits to interpretive deformation, to the kinds of
compromise Levinson is principally discussing.
IV. BACKWARDS
I have an unyielding sense of respect for Sanford Levinson as among
our generation's foremost constitutional scholars. Nothing that he says in
his present paper mitigates that respect, which cannot, however, extend to
acceptance of his claim that the ubiquitousness of compromise entails its
normative acceptability.
In every generation, we need to examine the history of textual
compromise, and I have tried to do that fairly briefly in this response. Of
course, I have not argued that sacred texts should not be permeable. On the
contrary, as a Talmudic scholar has put it, there is always a tension between
creative change of received textual meaning and unacceptable textual
distortion:
A viable system of law must not sacrifice either its spirit or its
letter. Hasty compromises, unfounded alterations, and whimsical
abandonment of legal traditions lead only to chaos. In order for a
legal system to endure and flourish, it is necessary for the law to be
flexible, elastic, and fluid, as well as definitive, clear, and
steadfast. 36
36. SAMUEL. N. HOENIG, THE ESSENCE OF TALMUDIC LAW AND THOUGHT 13 (1993). The
reader inspired to test the limits within traditions that also encourage interpretive creativity might
read Hoenig's description of the approaches of Rabbi Akivab and Rabbi Yishmael. Id. at 28-31.
The former's "fabulous acumen and ingenuity," however, could not have encompassed a reading of,
say, Isaiah chapters fifty-two and fifty-three that purported to prophesy any single individual-much
less a teacher like Jesus-within such verses as "the suffering servant," "the man of sorrows,"
etcetera. The Jews (and many Christians) have resisted such a compromised reading for 2000
years-a small miracle, perhaps.
935
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